

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
INTERNAL REVENUE SERVICE

TELECONFERENCE PUBLIC HEARING ON PROPOSED
REGULATIONS

"EXCISE TAX ON REPURCHASE OF CORPORATE STOCK"

[REG-115710-22]

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1 P R O C E E D I N G S

2 (10:00 a.m.)

3 MR. JONES: This is a public hearing on
4 Proposed Regulations regarding the Excise Tax on
5 Repurchase of Corporate Stock. The first speaker
6 on the agenda is Josh Odintz from the American
7 Chemistry Council. Just a reminder that each
8 speaker is allocated a maximum of ten minutes to
9 speak.

10 MR. ODINTZ: Good morning. Thank you
11 very much for having me today. My name is Joshua
12 Odintz, I'm a partner in Holland & Knight and I'm
13 here on behalf of the American Chemistry Council.
14 The ACC represents the leading companies engaged
15 in the business of chemistry. ACC member
16 companies apply the science of chemistry to create
17 and manufacture innovative products, make people's
18 lives better, healthier, and safer.

19 So once again, thank you for the
20 opportunity to testify today. We applaud Treasury
21 and IRS efforts in drafting the Proposed
22 Regulations. However, we continue to find issue

1 with how while prospectively eliminating Notice
2 2023-2's Per Se Rule, the Proposed Regulations
3 largely retained the notice's problematic Funding
4 Rule and urge Treasury and the IRS to fully
5 withdraw the same.

6 So first, I'll discuss the Funding Rule
7 and the principle of purpose test how they are
8 beyond the scope of Section 4501 and therefore
9 should be fully withdrawn. As enacted, Section
10 4501(d)(1) of the statute clearly contemplates the
11 imposition of the Section 4501 excise tax on
12 repurchases of foreign parent stock by U.S.
13 affiliates. It does not, however, contemplate
14 that such a repurchase is presumed to have
15 occurred solely by the occurrence of a payment
16 made by such specified affiliate to the foreign
17 parent. Under the Proposed Regulations, however,
18 the IRS can presume that a taxpayer is seeking to
19 avoid the excess tax simply because the IRS
20 determines that cash payments a taxpayer makes to
21 its U.S. foreign parent or other foreign affiliate
22 are to be used by such parent to fund a covered

1 purchase under a principal purpose test. This is
2 an extreme leap from the statutory language of
3 Section 4501, given the fact that many publicly
4 traded companies have long term stock buyback
5 programs in place at the parent level. Congress
6 did not take this approach in drafting Section
7 4501 and instead wrote the excess tax rules with
8 no mention of a funding concept. We believe these
9 legislative choices were deliberate and should be
10 respected.

11 Further, the language used in the
12 Funding Rule: funds by any means, including
13 through distributions, debt, or capital
14 contributions, directly or indirectly, can cover
15 an extraordinarily broad range of ordinary course
16 transactions. For example, a U.S. Subsidiary
17 could have a long history, or predating the excise
18 tax, by paying dividends of its annual earnings to
19 its foreign parents to support the parents
20 dividend to shareholders, or to fund a stock
21 buyback program. Such a normal course dividend
22 consistent with prior year practices should not be

1 considered as having a purpose to avoid the excise
2 tax. However, the -7 regulations would appear to
3 empower the IRS to take that unwarranted position
4 because the purpose to fund a foreign parent that
5 does the stock repurchase is treated as an
6 automatic purpose to avoid the excise tax.

7 As currently proposed, the Funding Rules
8 determination that longstanding corporate
9 transactions that were affected for the purpose of
10 funding a stock buyback prior to the act of the
11 tax are now somehow being undertaken with a
12 principal purpose to avoid the excess tax when
13 affected to fund a stock buyback post enactment.
14 And that's simply absurd. What is eminently
15 evident is that the Funding Rule along with the
16 principal purpose test is a material expansion of
17 the reach of the excess tax under Section 4501,
18 and it's not justified by the text -- the clear
19 reading of the text, or policies of the statute.
20 We urge the Treasury to withdraw the Funding Rule.

21 Second, I'd like to talk about the
22 choice that is put forth in the notice in the

1 Proposed Regulations. Both Treasury and the IRS
2 have previously stated that the notices Per Se
3 Rule were too broad and would be revised, and this
4 is after Notice 2023-2. However, rather than
5 fully withdraw the Per Se Rule, the Proposed
6 Regulations retain this rule for repurchases from
7 December 31st, 2022, and April 12th, 2024. In
8 these instances, if a taxpayer wishes to avoid the
9 notices Per Se Rule, it is required to adopt
10 overly broad Funding Rule under the Proposed
11 Regulations. This is something that Treasury and
12 the IRS could not have required under the APA,
13 Administrative Procedure Act or Section 7805.
14 Because most of the rules under -7 were not
15 announced in Notice 2023-2, they cannot be forced
16 upon taxpayers to apply retroactively to pre April
17 13th, 2024, stock repurchases. The ACC therefore
18 requests that the final regulations include a
19 complete withdrawal of a Per Se Rule.

20 And then finally, I'd like to talk about
21 how the principal purpose test, or the Funding
22 Rule creates a dangerous precedent. Yet another

1 reason for Treasury and the IRS to withdraw the
2 Funding Rule is that it could result in double
3 taxation circumstances where the home jurisdiction
4 of the applicable foreign corporation has also
5 adopted a buyback excise tax. Since the enactment
6 of the excise tax in 2022, other countries have
7 taken steps to implement similar excise taxes
8 within their own jurisdiction.

9 For example, in 2023, Canada formally
10 introduced a bill establishing a 2 percent excise
11 tax on certain repurchases of stock of specified
12 Canadian entities. Should the Canadian stock
13 repurchase excess tax be enacted, the current
14 Funding Rule could be used in Canada to treat a
15 U.S. subsidiary as funding its Canadian parent
16 with a principal purpose to avoid the excise tax.
17 While at the same time, the proposed Canadian
18 repurchase tax regime could independently levy an
19 excise tax on the Canadian parent for repurchasing
20 its own stock. This could result in double
21 taxation. Further, the Canadian law could be
22 expanded to apply the funding mechanism signed to

1 tax stock repurchases in the United States.

2 The French government also said it wants
3 to enact a share buyback tax of at least 1 percent
4 as part of this 2025 budget. Another example
5 worth pointing out, in 2023, the Dutch parliament
6 also enacted a 15 percent dividend withholding tax
7 on share buybacks in the Netherlands, set to take
8 effect on January 1st, 2025, and could give rise
9 to the same bad results, as noted in the example
10 above. And the U.S. funding will provide a path
11 for foreign countries to tax U.S. stock
12 repurchases, and we are concerned that foreign
13 countries could adopt a similar Funding Rule
14 mechanism. For these reasons, the ACC
15 respectfully requested request the complete
16 withdrawal of the Funding Rule from the final
17 regulations.

18 Thank you very much, and I'm happy to
19 answer any questions.

20 MR. JONES: Thank you very much.

21 MS. DOBI: Thank you.

22 MR. JONES: Our next scheduled speaker

1 is Alan Pasetsky from the Global Business
2 Alliance.

3 MR. PASETSKY: Good morning. My name is
4 Alan Pasetsky and I'm here on behalf of the Global
5 Business Alliance, GBA for short. I appreciate
6 the opportunity to testify today regarding the
7 Section 4501 Stock Buyback Tax Proposed
8 Regulations. GBA proudly represents nearly 200 of
9 the world's best known brands. They are American
10 companies with a global heritage. International
11 companies operating in the U.S. Invest over \$5
12 trillion into our economy and have created nearly
13 8 million jobs, including 250,000 new
14 manufacturing jobs in the past five years. GBA
15 advocates for policies that ensure fair and
16 non-discriminatory treatment of foreign based
17 companies operating in the U.S. We believe that
18 such policies are vital to enhancing american
19 employment and bolstering U.S. economic expansion.

20 First, a little history. Although the
21 stock buyback tax was intended to impose a 1
22 percent excise tax on stock repurchased by

1 publicly traded U.S. corporations, it also applies
2 when a U.S. Affiliate actually acquires the stock
3 of its publicly traded foreign parent. The
4 initial guidance in 2023-2 provided a principle
5 purpose Funding Rule and a procedural, whereby
6 almost any ordinary course payments by a U.S.
7 subsidiary to its foreign parenthood would have
8 been deemed to have been undertaken to avoid the
9 excise tax if such payments were made within two
10 years of the buyback. Notwithstanding that the
11 U.S. subsidiary never actually purchased any of
12 its foreign parent shares.

13 The current Proposed Regs prospectively
14 eliminate this Per Se Rule, but unfortunately they
15 retain the principal purpose Funding Rule with a
16 new twist. The new twist is that if any principle
17 purpose of a funding is to fund the stock buyback,
18 then there's a conclusive principle purpose to
19 avoid the tax. So if a taxpayer is deemed to have
20 a purpose of avoiding the excise tax simply
21 because the IRS determines that a cash payment by
22 a taxpayer makes to his foreign parent may have

1 been used by such parents upon the buyback. This
2 twist negates the need to have a purpose to avoid
3 the excise tax, which I would think would be
4 required as part of a principal purpose test, and
5 it authorizes the IRS to simply oppose the tax
6 when U.S. sub makes a payment to a foreign
7 affiliate and the foreign of parent repurchases
8 its stock.

9 The preamble to the proposed regulation
10 simply dismisses the contention that an actual
11 purchase of foreign parent stock is required,
12 stating that a Funding Rule is necessary to carry
13 out the purposes of the tax, which could easily be
14 avoided absent such a rule. Treasury officials
15 have indicated that the Funding Rule is designed
16 out of a concern to curb a potential abuse whereby
17 if a U.S. affiliate had a plan to actually
18 purchase foreign parent stock and now decided to
19 instead make a payment to the foreign parent for
20 it to repurchase its own stock to avoid the tax.
21 A fatal flaw, though, with Treasury's concern is
22 that this perceived abuse doesn't exist. U.S.

1 affiliates rarely ever purchased the stock of
2 their foreign parents. GBA even surveyed its
3 members, and in the very rare case that had
4 occurred, it was done for the purpose of funding
5 employee compensation, which is an excise tax
6 exemption under Section 4501.

7 If the true concern is that a U.S.
8 subsidiary that would have actually acquired its
9 foreign parent stock and still conceived of an
10 alternative structure to avoid the excise tax,
11 then the regulation should target that precise
12 concern. The current rules do not. The excise
13 tax is not intended to apply to stock buybacks
14 undertaken by foreign publicly traded companies.
15 It should not be invoked simply because a foreign
16 parent uses cash it validly receives from ordinary
17 necessary, say, interest, royalties or other
18 similar payments from its U.S. subsidiaries in
19 order to execute its buyback.

20 Under this rule, say, a foreign parent
21 is scheduled to do a buyback in July 1st. The
22 excess tax would apply if it used its regular

1 course monthly royalty interest payments that it
2 receives on June 30th to do the buyback. This is
3 clearly not a result intended by the statute.
4 Interestingly, the forming rule even causes the
5 tax to be imposed where foreign legal restrictions
6 would prevent a U.S. subsidiary from acquiring its
7 parent stock. The application of an excise tax to
8 create a fiction that could not legally exist also
9 demonstrates that the Funding Rule goes beyond the
10 intent of the statute. Nonetheless, Treasury
11 simply dismissed this concern in response to
12 comments made to the notice, which leads me to the
13 next topic.

14 I would be remiss not to mention the
15 recent local bribe on Ohio versus EPA Supreme
16 Court decisions which will undoubtedly affect the
17 Treasury's and IRS regulatory decisions and
18 processes. These cases stand for the proposition
19 that courts must engage in their own
20 interpretation of statutes and determine their
21 best reading. They also emphasize that
22 governmental agencies must consider all

1 contemporaneous comments under the APA and provide
2 explicit rationale for their decisions and
3 appropriate responses to comments made. In this
4 regard, GPA believes the Funding Rule does not
5 represent a good reading, much less the best
6 reading of the very clear statutory text of
7 Section 4501.

8 I'd like to now provide some more basic
9 examples to illustrate why this proposed Funding
10 Rule ignores any avoidance of the excise tax
11 requirement and should be revoked. Josh already
12 talked about dividends and how a normal course
13 post excise tax dividend, consistent with prior
14 year's practice, could be deemed to avoid the
15 excise tax and result in the tax being imposed.
16 It's even unclear how a taxpayer could establish
17 that the cash for the buyback didn't come from an
18 ordinary course payment from the U.S.

19 To make this even more egregious, the
20 dividends from the U.S. are due to be used first
21 by the foreign parent to do the buyback,
22 regardless of the dividends or fundings from

1 foreign affiliates globally. So if a foreign
2 parent receives \$10 million from the U.S. and,
3 say, \$100 million from its other affiliates, the
4 \$10 million is due to fund the buyback first, and
5 the tax would be imposed if a \$10 million buyback
6 was done, even though 90 percent of the cash the
7 foreign parent received came from other sources
8 outside the U.S.

9 Another common and troubling scenario is
10 where a U.S. subsidiary borrows funds from its
11 foreign parent at arm's length to build new
12 facilities that will employ thousands of U.S.
13 workers. The arm's length interest payments and
14 repayment of the loan principal by the U.S.
15 subsidiary could result in an excise tax if the
16 foreign parent does a buyback. When a transaction
17 pursuant to an Advance Pricing Agreement where the
18 IRS has officially blessed the payment as
19 legitimate, ordinary, and arm's length, say for a
20 plain purchase of inventory or services, could
21 cause an imposition of the excise tax. There are
22 thousands of ordinary course transactions that

1 could be swept into the successfully broad Funding
2 Rule, all of which no purpose to avoid the excise
3 tax.

4 While the preamble to the regulation
5 states that the elimination of the Per Se Rule
6 from the initial notice satisfy taxpayer concerns,
7 this is clearly not the case. GBA disagrees that
8 the Funding Rule, including the principal purpose
9 test with the new twist I explained earlier, is
10 necessary to accomplish the intent of the statute
11 and produces ridiculous unintended results. And
12 consequently, GBA requests to buy back regulations
13 eliminate the Funding Rule.

14 In the event Treasury and IRS declined
15 to revoke the Funding Rule, however, the principal
16 purpose test should at least be revised to take
17 into account the taxpayers actual intent to avoid
18 the excise tax, as opposed to dealing existence of
19 a bad intent. We provided a simple modification
20 in our comment letter to accomplish this that's
21 consistent with other anti-abuse rules and would
22 exempt ordinary course transactions. I cannot

1 emphasize enough that any remaining anti-avoidance
2 rule must part your transactions with a principal
3 purpose to avoid the tax, not a purpose to avoid a
4 funding, and not require proving a negative fact
5 to demonstrate that principal purpose.

6 There were also other issues with the
7 Funding Rule that should be carefully considered,
8 such as the interaction with tax and non-tax
9 treaties. Although the tax was enacted as an
10 excise tax, it effectively acts like a withholding
11 tax on outbound payments by the U.S. subsidiary.
12 Assuming subsidiary declares a dividend without
13 any knowledge of how the cash will be deployed by
14 the foreign parent, and there's a treaty between
15 the foreign parent country and the U.S.
16 Subsidiary country provides for 0 percent on
17 dividends. If the payment is made and an excise
18 tax is deemed to apply because it links the
19 dividend to the repurchase, there will be a 1
20 percent excise tax even though this contradicts
21 the treaty, which mandates a 0 percent withholding
22 tax on dividends. The preamble asserts the

1 Funding Rule doesn't apply because it's an excise
2 tax on a domestic subsidiary, but in fact it's a
3 withholding tax substitute on the U.S. payments.
4 The Treasury also doesn't adequately address our
5 concerns regarding relevant non-income tax
6 treaties that, on their face, apply to excise
7 taxes, which we discussed in our comment letter.

8 GBA reiterates the comments just made in
9 prior testimony that the taxpayer should not have
10 to choose between applying the for Per Se Rule and
11 the overly broad Funding Rule for repurchases
12 between the effective date and April 12th. And we
13 also have concerns about issuing the recent
14 procedural regulations on July 23rd to require
15 companies to pay in by October 31st because the
16 Funding Rule does not give enough guidance or time
17 to properly compute the tax. Also, we would like
18 the netting rule revised, if possible, for
19 payments where stock is issued to an employee or
20 an affiliate where a public corporation, domestic
21 and foreign affiliates should be allowed to
22 receive the stock, not just the covered company

1 itself.

2 So, in conclusion, GBA strongly
3 represents removal of the Funding Rule and the
4 regulations. It is necessary to prevent this
5 overreach, a tremendous burden on taxpayers and
6 the IRS to navigate this ill focused principle
7 purpose test touching everyday, ordinary
8 transactions. Sometimes we need to take a step
9 back and remember the big picture. Treasury
10 shouldn't just consider whether it could impose
11 the Funding Rule, but should consider the
12 additional question of whether it should. Based
13 upon the reasons enumerated today, I think that
14 answer is abundantly clear.

15 Thank you very much for your time today.

16 MR. JONES: Thank you. Our next speaker
17 is Joshua Odintz, representing the Northern Lights
18 Coalition.

19 MR. ODINTZ: Good morning again. I'm
20 still Joshua Odintz from Holland & Knight. Now
21 I'm here on behalf of the Northern Lights
22 Coalition and ad hoc Coalition of Domestic and

1 Foreign Headquartered Businesses. The Coalition
2 is concerned about one part of the Proposed
3 Regulations, the Funding Rules. The Coalition's
4 comment letters address many reasons why the Per
5 Se Rule and the Funding Rule, collectively, the
6 Funding Rules, should be withdrawn.

7 My testimony will highlight a few of the
8 key points raised in the comment letter and a new
9 issue that arose after the submission of the last
10 comment letter. I will cover the following four
11 topics on my testimony: First, the legislative
12 history of Section 4501; second, the interaction
13 of tax and trade treaties with the Proposed
14 Regulations; third, the choice between applying
15 the notice for early adoption of the Proposed
16 Regulations; and fourth, statutory interpretation
17 in light of the Loper Bright relentless decisions
18 by the Supreme Court.

19 So first, let's turn on legislative
20 history. Congress crafted Section 4501 in a way
21 that had, and was intended to have, a limited
22 applicability to foreign parenting groups. Except

1 for groups that inverted after September 20, 2021,
2 the only way the excess tax can be triggered with
3 respect to a foreign parented group is if a U.S.
4 Affiliate purchases foreign parent stock from a
5 third party. Congress initially considered, but
6 rejected a proposal that might have applied more
7 broadly to foreign parenthood groups with U.S.
8 subsidiaries. A draft Senate bill from Chairman
9 Wyden September 21, included a provision to impose
10 the excise tax on foreign parenthood groups based
11 on a pro rata portion of the U.S. affiliates gross
12 receipts to the group's overall gross receipts.
13 In 2021, the Senate Committee on Finance
14 considered concerns that such attacks would
15 operate as an indirect tax on foreign activities,
16 similar to the tax at issue in Vodafone in India.

17 Congress deliberately chose to not to
18 adopt this broad provision and instead enacted the
19 narrow provisions that are contained in Section
20 4501(d)(1), taxing only the acquisition of foreign
21 parent stock by a specified U.S. affiliate of that
22 foreign parent. A broader rule applicable to

1 inverted groups was included, but the rest of the
2 universe of foreign parenting groups is not
3 included unless a U.S. Subsidiary directly
4 purchased parent company stock. Based on what
5 Congress did and did not enact, it is clear that
6 Congress intended that Section 4501 would have
7 very limited applicability to non-inverted foreign
8 parented groups.

9 The statutory regime was not an
10 accident. There are obvious reasons, based on
11 concerns about complexity as well as potential
12 retaliation against U.S.-parented multinational
13 groups, to limit the tax to domestic parent
14 acquisitions or direct acquisitions by U.S.
15 Subsidiaries of a U.S. parent.

16 Second, I'd like to cover tax and trade
17 treaties. As described in our comment letter, the
18 Proposed Regulations conflict with income tax
19 treaties. The preamble takes issue at this point
20 and argues that the excise tax is not covered by
21 an income tax treaty because it is an excise tax.
22 The Proposed Regulations operate as a disguise

1 withholding tax. As applied, the Proposed
2 Regulations would add an additional 100 basis
3 points of tax on dividends, interest, royalties,
4 and other cross-border payments in conflict with
5 U.S. treaty obligations. Further, U.S. income tax
6 treaties apply to excise taxes where one party
7 that the treaty discriminates against the
8 residents of the other party. The Proposed
9 Regulations would apply significant burdens on the
10 U.S. subsidiaries of foreign corporations to
11 determine the purpose and use of every
12 cross-border payment, a burden which is not placed
13 on domestic corporations. U.S. headquarters
14 groups would not be subject to such burdens.

15 Our comment letter also highlights that
16 the principal purpose test in the Per Se Rule
17 conflict with friendship, commerce, and navigation
18 treaties, or FCNs, with our closest and oldest
19 allies and with a broad range of bilateral
20 investment treaties, known as BITs, with countries
21 with which we -- with which we wish to maintain
22 and improve a close relationship or improve our

1 relationships.

2 I'd like to highlight the Netherlands
3 FCN. The treaty prohibits restrictions on
4 payments, remittances, or transfers of funds or of
5 financial instruments between the U.S. and the
6 Netherlands and their several territories, or to
7 third countries. Taxes, income taxes, or specific
8 -- or I'm sorry -- taxes are specifically included
9 as exchange restrictions. Income taxes subject to
10 bilateral tax treaties are reserved by the US.
11 Excise taxes are not reserved by the U.S., and
12 there is no other exception. The United States
13 agreement exception -- the United States agreement
14 not to tax payments except to the extent necessary
15 to maintain or restore U.S. monetary reserves.
16 Thus, if the NPR claims to stop buyback tax is
17 exempt from dual tax treaties, it ipso facto falls
18 out of the reserve power of the FCN treaties with
19 respect to income taxes and is then subject to the
20 restrictions on taxes on payments. The NPRM
21 principle purpose test and the Per Se Rule applied
22 only to payments and are therefore precisely

1 described in the FCN treaties with the provisions
2 comparable to Articles 11 and 12 of the
3 Netherlands FCN.

4 The cream off the top rule of the NPRM
5 also violates the Netherlands FCN because it
6 treats all fundings as originating first in the
7 United States and is not a reasonable allocation
8 or apportionment of the amount of funding arising
9 from U.S. sources. There is nothing in the
10 legislative history that indicates Congress
11 intended to tax -- to override its tax FCN and bit
12 treaty obligations, Congress must provide clear
13 and manifest intent to abrogate or modify a treaty
14 by a leader statute. I referred to Whitney versus
15 Robertson and Posadas versus National Citibank.
16 Such clear and manifest intent is lacking. In
17 fact, the legislative history makes no reference
18 to income tax, FCN, or BIT treaties. Congress,
19 not Treasury, has the authority to override treaty
20 obligations. Congress has not done so, and the
21 Funding Rules cannot conflict with our treaty
22 obligations.

1 In the interest of time, I'll just point
2 out, as I've already pointed out in a prior
3 comment for a different client, that the notice --
4 sorry -- the Proposed Regulations forced the
5 Hobson's Choice between alternative regimes,
6 specifically the Per Se Rule and the principal
7 purpose test, and so the taxpayer is required to
8 either obey a withdrawn Per Se Rule in the future
9 or apply the apply the -7 rules retroactively.
10 And the Proposed Regulations try to impose new
11 regulation -- new consequences, and legal duties
12 to conduct -- to conduct before the date of
13 publication of its regulations. And we believe
14 this is an end run around the APA of Section
15 7805(b).

16 Finally, I'd like to cover Loper &
17 Bright and relentless. After the Coalition filed
18 its comment letter to the NPRM, the Supreme Court
19 overturned the Chevron Doctrine and Loper Bright
20 on relentless. We think the rules regarding
21 foreign parented groups and NPRM were very likely
22 invalid under the Chevron Doctrine, and they're

1 now even more like -- they're now more likely to
2 be held invalid under post Chevron Doctrines.
3 After Chevron, a court and interpreting a vague
4 statute must ascertain the best meaning. Any
5 other meeting of the statute by an agency is
6 impermissible. Section 4501(d)(1) is not of the
7 statute and is extremely limited in its
8 applicability to foreign parenting groups. In the
9 case of a foreign parent, the excise tax applies
10 to the stock repurchase of foreign parented stock
11 by a U.S. affiliate and to certain foreign
12 parented groups that averted after a particular
13 date. Congress chose not to go further than that.

14 Congress provided authority for Treasury
15 to issue regulations, including the application of
16 rules under subsection d. Treasury also has
17 general authority to prevent the avoidance of the
18 statute. However, Congress did not provide
19 authority to Treasury to rewrite the statute to
20 broaden its impact to include transactions
21 previously deliberately excluded from the new
22 excise tax. The Funding Rules do not reflect the

1 best meaning of addressing avoidance of the
2 statute. As previously described by our comment
3 letters, the Per Se Rules would apply to every
4 cross-border transaction between the U.S.
5 Subsidiary and its foreign parent other than the
6 distribution. The preamble in the NPRM concedes
7 that the Per Se Rule is overly broad and
8 applicable to non-avoidance transactions. The
9 Proposed Regulations principal purpose test also
10 goes well beyond avoidance transactions by deeming
11 certain unrelated ordinary business transactions
12 as tax avoidance. The plain reading of the
13 statute and the best interpretation of the grant
14 of authority do not support the conversion of
15 ordinary business transactions into tax avoidance
16 schemes.

17 Thank you for the opportunity to
18 testify. I welcome any questions.

19 MS. DOBI: Thank you. So if there's
20 anyone who wants to speak via teleconference, they
21 may do so. The AT&T operator could allow anyone
22 who would like to speak or unmute them if they'd

1 like to testify or offer comments. We're happy to
2 hear those as well.

3 OPERATOR: And this is the operator. If
4 they wish to speak, we would need them to press
5 one, then zero.

6 MS. DOBI: Is there -- I take it no one
7 wants to speak or offer comments.

8 OPERATOR: We have no one queuing up
9 wishing to speak at this time.

10 MS. DOBI: Okay, thank you.

11 MR. JONES: So with that, I think this
12 hearing is concluded. Thank you.

13 MS. DOBI: Thank you.

14 (Whereupon, at 10:29 a.m., the

15 PROCEEDINGS were adjourned.)

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1 CERTIFICATE OF NOTARY PUBLIC

2 DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA

3 I, Stephanie Kern, notary public in and
4 for the District of Columbia, do hereby certify
5 that the forgoing PROCEEDING was duly recorded and
6 thereafter reduced to print under my direction;
7 that the witnesses were sworn to tell the truth
8 under penalty of perjury; that said transcript is a
9 true record of the testimony given by witnesses;
10 that I am neither counsel for, related to, nor
11 employed by any of the parties to the action in
12 which this proceeding was called; and, furthermore,
13 that I am not a relative or employee of any
14 attorney or counsel employed by the parties hereto,
15 nor financially or otherwise interested in the
16 outcome of this action.

17

18

19 (Signature and Seal on File)

20 -----

21 Notary Public, in and for the District of Columbia

22